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ABSTRACT 
This article provides a macro-perspective on China’s repositioning in the global and 
regional cultural economy, and in doing so questions the structural impact of past 
practices on future export aspirations. Whereas most accounts of China’s media are 
predicated on top-down control models, the article proposes a media development 
framework appropriate to China’ s aspirations in the first decade of the twentieth-first 
century. The framework is most relevant to those creative content industries in which 
sunk costs – that is, one-off costs of creative content development – are more than fifty 
percent of total outlay. Starting from a low base – and constrained by a legacy of state 
censorship and widespread intellectual property abuse – China aspires to move from 
‘made in China’ to ‘created in China’.  
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 China’s superman  
In October 2003 China's first spaceman, Colonel Yang Liwei, descended to earth on the Inner 
Mongolian grasslands after a heroic 21-hour solo flight. The media proclaimed a coming of age 
as China became the third nation after the Soviet Union and the United States to launch a manned 
space flight. The People’s Daily, the flagship organ of the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed 
that Colonel Yang’s first words upon ripping off his space helmet were, ‘I'm proud of my 
motherland’ (Peoples Daily, 16 October 2003).  
This article examines what I call China’s ‘great new leap forward’ (Keane, 2007). I use 
this image as a counterpoint to the historically significant but ill-fated ‘Great Leap Forward’ – a 
nation-wide movement (1959 – 1962) intended to propel China from a technologically backward 
country to overtake the advanced capitalist West. The focus in the following discussion is not on 
‘hard’ technology and infrastructure – the most commonly used proxies for development – but 
rather ‘soft power’, a term coined by Joseph Nye (1990) to refer to power based on intangible or 
indirect influences, such as culture, values and ideology. In particular, the discussion addresses 
the issue of how culture and creativity are conjoined in Chinese development strategies. 
I wish to point out at the outset that there are many instances of exciting creative content 
within Chinese media. My argument, however, is that China is structurally constrained by a 
‘circular flow’ of products (Schumpeter, 1942). Duplication, combined with a national ‘creativity 
deficit’ (Keane, 2004) is reflected in the reality that China’s creative content industries have yet 
to garner the international success claimed by Hong Kong, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. The 
discussion that ensues engages with the concepts of creativity and innovation, which were key 
themes of China’s first international creative industries forum in Beijing in July 2005. As I have 
pointed out elsewhere, Chinese policy makers enthusiastically embrace innovation (chuangxin) 
(Keane, 2004). However, the recent focus on creativity (chuangyi), largely engendered by a 
breakout of creative industry forums (see Hui this issue), is more challenging to national policy 
makers. Whereas innovation is rendered in Chinese as ‘creating something new’, or ‘bringing 
forth new ideas’, the word for creativity in Chinese brings together the ideas of ‘creating’ 
(chuang) and ‘ideas’ (yi), but with a more overt emphasis on art and imagination. In China, the 
capacity to imagine alternatives to the socialist plan is often constrained by political correctness 
and a fear of stepping over the line – despite regular proclamations of ‘a hundred flowers 
blooming and a hundred schools of thought contending’ (baihua qifang, baijia zhengming).     
In gauging China’s development opportunities in creative industries, I will not attempt to 
engage with the ontological question of what counts for creativity, or its associations with 
freedom and liberal democracy. This is a much more ambitious line of enquiry. Nor do I enter 
into debates from the field of psychology about how Chinese culture and upbringing engender 
creative thinking (see Nisbett, 2005). In the context of the Beijing Forum, the key debate is about 
value adding through learnt skills and processes – including marketing, promotion, editing, and 
script development. Incidentally, within media and advertising industries most of these tasks are 
routinely conducted in teams. For the more feasible task of determining how creativity 
contributes to economic development and export success, I use a broad definition that privileges 
utility over aesthetics. In The Creative Mind Margaret Boden writes that ‘creativity is the ability 
to come up with ideas that are new, surprising, and valuable’ (Boden, 2004: 1).  
To take this proposition a step further, there are identifiable creative processes that 
transform ideas to marketable deliverables (CCPR, 2003). One of the key ingredients for China’s 
success, therefore, is the development of such processes in order to bring about better 
development, distribution, and ultimately export of creative goods and services. The potential for 
creative export development is predominantly located in audio-visual industries – television, 
cinema, animation and video games.i In these industries the licensing of rights is central to 
profitability. In China, however, the playing field is structured differently with less revenue 
associated with sunk costs and low return on rights. This is the key problem, as I see it it. 
 
China’s Super Girl 
The predictable surge of nationalist pride associated with Colonel Yang’s space exploits 
generated high ratings for China Central Television (CCTV) amid generalised euphoria that the 
Chinese nation would one day be a superpower like the US. But here is another image worth 
considering, again coincidentally with connections to Inner Mongolia. In October 2005, Hunan 
Satellite TV in southern China broadcast the final instalment of Mongolian Cow Yoghurt Super 
Girl (chaoji nüsheng), a variation on the Pop Idol format (Keane et al., 2006). Tens of thousands 
of fans responded overwhelmingly to the winner, Li Yuchun, a spiky-haired twenty-one year old 
music student from Sichuan province. Some suggested that Ms. Li resembled an animation 
character more than a standard Chinese pop star. In a short time, the winner of this popular TV 
show was better known to the masses of television viewers than either China’s superman, 
Colonel Yang Liwei, or the pantheons of sanitised role models approved by the Chinese 
government. 
Both examples – China’s national spaceman and Hunan’s Super Girl – indicate that China 
can achieve anything that the ‘developed West’ can. In the first instance, technology transfer over 
a period of years (including alleged spying on U.S. space missions) provided China with R&D 
capacity to develop a successful space program. In the second instance, a form of cultural 
technology transfer transpired. As the example of pop idolatry demonstrates, global business 
practices provide valuable lessons in prosperity for China’s entrepreneurs.  
 
 
Looking forward: an evolutionary perspective 
In an important study of ‘transitional China’, Liu Xielin and Steven White (2001) draw attention 
to the need for system-level approaches to understanding innovation. Their evolutionary 
perspective contrasts with approaches adopted within media studies, where research is more often 
sector-specific (film, television, Internet etc.), and seldom addresses industry development.ii Of 
course, the value of looking at the micro-level is that it allows us to identify notable successes 
and failures – as well as industry-specific practices – which might be glossed over when 
collectively grouped as creative, content or cultural industries.  
English-language literature on China’s media and cultural industries frequently fails to 
fully account for broader structural issues that characterise system-level transition. While 
observers of globalisation take it as a matter of faith that China is evolving from a command 
economy to a market economy, it is yet unclear as to the form that the Chinese market will take – 
or if China can develop truly competitive creative content industries. One potent image of China 
is that of an aquatic animal learning to live on land (Gu, 2005). To take this image further, it is 
the broader biosphere that determines how this creature will evolve. The factors that determine 
China’s competitiveness are more than ever global since World Trade Organisation entry in 
December 2001. The Chinese media are less insulated from global competition and are 
increasingly integrated within a convergent communications landscape.  
China’s competitive advantage is currently low-cost labour and a massive consumer 
market. What then, are the systemic processes that might engender creativity and innovation over 
time, conceivably in the ‘Chinese century’? ‘Created in China’ is just such an evolutionary 
process, a work-in-progress beginning from the ground up. In a recent study of innovation in 
digital content industries in Australia (Cunningham et al., 2004) the authors nominated a range of 
‘actors’, and evaluated relative characteristics and contributions to innovation. These actors 
included universities, leading firms, industry associations, cultural agencies and regulatory 
agencies. In analysing the topography of a national innovation system in China, however, Liu and 
White argue that it is difficult to make these kinds of comparisons. For them, systems-level 
characteristics concern structure, dynamics, and performance.iii Structure refers to divisions of 
labour and organisational boundaries; dynamics concern how different actors engage across 
boundaries in order to incubate and develop ideas; while performance accounts for the effects of 
structure and dynamics on the quality of outputs.   
In differentiating between the command era (1949 – 1978) and the reform era (1979 – ), 
Liu and White note three generic layers of actors in the innovation system: primary actors, 
secondary actors, and institutions. The primary actors are the frontline players. In the media 
industries these include producers, writers, developers, animators, production companies, end-
users (audiences), training institutions (such as the Chinese Communication University), TV 
stations (CCTV, Hunan Satellite TV), and so on. Secondary actors are organizations that affect 
the behaviour of the primary actors. In most instances they are organisations responsible for 
planning and mandating particular behaviour. For instance, the State Administration of Radio 
Film and TV (SARFT) directly (and indirectly) influences the kinds of material viewed on 
Chinese television; the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) provides licences for digital 
content industries. The third level is the institutional level. According to Liu and White, this 
refers to ‘practices, rules, and other disembodied organisations that guide or constrain actor’s 
behaviour’ (2001: 1005). Such institutions include practices endemic to the system, such as 
propensity to cooperate rather than compete, and to imitate rather than innovate.     
Liu and White’s analysis is useful to examine the Chinese cultural and media innovations 
system. Structural divisions of labour and administrative boundaries existed under the former 
planned economy (1950s – late-1980s). People were appointed to jobs not necessarily on the 
basis of skill, but because there was a need to fill positions. Appointment decisions in the media 
industries were often made by bureaucrats far removed from the production process. In addition 
to the perfunctory division of labour, structural duplication (chongfu jianshe) – a direct result of 
the political need to replicate designated models of cultural and media production throughout 
China – meant that each province and autonomous region (a total of 32)iv had its own 
Propaganda Department, its own State Administration of Radio Film and TV bureau, as well as 
other regulatory authorities, all guided by the central body. The dynamics of innovation were 
reduced because work units (see Zhang, this issue) were unable to compete across organisational 
boundaries or cross into different media. Nor were there always clear divisions of responsibility. 
What Lieberthal (1995) has termed ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ led to regulatory profusion, 
and this has more recently translated into confusion for aspiring international companies. For 
instance, a creative media company wishing to apply for a streaming content license may have to 
apply to multiple regulators (SARFT, MII, SAPP, and SAIC).v       
With the benefit of hindsight, and lessons learnt from international joint venture companies, 
China’s media policy makers now accept that the most negative outcome of the planned system 
was performance criteria. Prior to the 1990s, producers, artists, and writers produced what was 
required by political masters, with little attention to economic efficiency, sales, ratings, and 
reader/user-satisfaction. A legacy of this system is that many primary actors are unsure of how to 
be competitive, how to break out of the dependencies of the command system, and how to exploit 
the value inherent in creative content (for instance, copyrights). While there is recognition of the 
profitability of the cultural sector, industry processes rarely follow international best practice, 
resulting in frustration on the part of many international companies.vi In general, such failings not 
only retard the growth of national champions, but also internationally exportable creative content. 
On 22 August 2005, a report in the People’s Daily lamented China’s ‘cultural trade deficit’, 
noting that in 2004 China imported nearly 1.2 million audio-visual products, the same amount as 
it exported. However, the value of the exports was significantly lower. According a spokesperson 
from the Ministry of Culture, the market share of Chinese cultural products in the US was close 
to zero (People’s Daily 22/8/2005).  
 
 
 
 
Becoming competitive 
Innovation is widespread within the Chinese economy – and certainly within the many 
technology research institutes. But there are systemic reasons why China does not better exploit 
the innovate potential of its creative workforce. Aside from censorship, lack of finance is a major 
reason why ideas fail. Projects lack the scale of development assistance that typifies the creative 
content industries in open developed economies. Lack of finance is also a consequence of 
structure. In other words, duplication and fragmentation of media and cultural businesses, and 
work units (danwei), creates little incentive to raise project capital to produce a work that may be 
sold in multiple markets.   
At the Beijing Creative Industries and Innovation Forum, I was struck by the number of 
Chinese speakers who referred to creative industries as the ‘next stage’ of development from 
cultural industries. Of course, these thoughts echo rhetoric surrounding the creative economy in a 
number of countries. The weighting given to stages of development in China is undeniably 
beholden in the first instance to economic reform and modernisation; and secondly to a ‘Chinese 
future’ scenario according to which the nation will leapfrog stages of development by adopting 
new technologies.  
 The idea that creative industries represents a developmental stage from state ownership of 
cultural institutions to full-blown cultural modernity is a useful manoeuvre, although not 
altogether illuminating. A Marxist developmental trajectory obliges us to acknowledge the 
transitional impacts of entrepreneurship and technology on society. This is a position that would 
have excited Joseph Schumpeter, who argued that entrepreneurship was compatible with 
socialism. The entrepreneur’s role in the economy is to disrupt the ‘circular flow’ by which the 
same products are produced and through which dynamism is removed (Schumpeter, 1942; 
Heilbroner, 1996: 298).  
In this view China needs its entrepreneurs who – it is assumed – will work with 
governments to realise the common good of making capitalism work for socialism. The level of 
media and governmental recognition of the Beijing Forum indicated that arguments about the 
economic value of culture are winning support. Entrepreneurs are engaged. This is most evident 
in China’s mega-cities, Shanghai and Beijing. The reality, however, is that creative industries is 
not so much a stage of development as the cultural sector catching up with China’s economic 
reforms. In short, it is about systemic transition led by entrepreneurs and championed by the 
affluent middle classes. Such transition necessitates policy liberalisations to enable further 
progress. The project does run the risk of stalling if the Chinese government loses the will to 
reform. 
My own thoughts about development are somewhat different to those advanced at the 
Beijing forum. The key to China’s competitiveness in the global cultural economy depends on 
structural changes, which in turn engender new dynamics among primary agents, reconfiguring 
the landscape of innovation. In achieving these dynamics through a combination of market 
correction, appropriate intellectual property models, and policy liberalisation over time, China 
will move from low-value to high-value production.   
 
Outsourced production 
China has become a manufacturing colossus – a thousand pound gorilla dominating global 
production of textile, footwear, and toys – and more recently electronics and white goods. ‘Made 
in China’ signifies cheap goods for consumers, along with a leakage of jobs from the developed 
economies. According to the principle of comparative advantage, China excels in labour 
intensive industries, those that cost less energy, capital and resources, and which advantage of 
skilful hands. Everyone needs a job, and Chinese workers can offer better solutions. 
Off-shoring – or outsourcing of production to low cost locations – is normally associated 
with manufacturing. However, the model also applies to the creative industries. This is 
particularly evident in animation. According to some estimates, up to 90 percent of the world’s 
animation is produced in Asia (Miller et al,. 2001). Japanese animators utilise low cost Chinese 
animation ‘factories’. Out-souring applies to fee-for-service work in the digital content industries. 
According to Jerry Wang (see interview this issue), ‘The only real way so far for creative people 
to make money so far has been to serve clients; for example clients like Intel or Sony. In this 
model there is limited creativity.’ (Interview with author Beijing 20 July 2005)  Indeed, the core 
problem with the ‘designed in the West, made in China’ model is that China gains little from the 
IP generated.  
 
 Cloning 
Despite the success of Super Girl, the show was hardly original or creative. It was a copy of an 
international formula, like many of the shows of the Hunan Television Group. In 2002 Hunan 
Economic Channel produced a version of Big Brother soporifically entitled Perfect Holiday 
(wanmei jiaqi), which prompted the copyright holders Endemol to contact lawyers in China. The 
producer of Perfect Holiday the previous year had concocted a look-alike version of Survivor 
filmed in Sichuan Province called Into Shangri-La (zouru xianggelila). 
By imitating global successes many of China’s media and communication industries are now 
positioned at the threshold of profitability. In short, imitating dominates in China because 
financing, producing and distributing original content is difficult. Sometimes the practice of 
imitation is a positive phenomenon, as in the example of Super Girl. However, the structural 
impediments identified above predispose many to imitate. Reliance upon cloning other’s success 
impedes the development of original value. This practice applies across a range of media 
industries: television, cinema, video gaming, and the Internet.  
 
Formats and co-productions 
Global business practices provide valuable lessons in prosperity for China’s entrepreneurs. A 
further shift up the value chain is the joint venture (JV). In the business sphere, joint ventures 
function as a means of entry into a massive consumer market for international companies, as well 
as providing opportunities to exploit cheap labour. In cinema and TV industries, joint ventures 
take the form of co-productions or formats. When knowledge is shared though association with 
international companies the benefits to local creativity are tangible. In particular, the co-
production model allows Chinese producers to access new distribution networks. Formatting is a 
generic term for licensing copyright in different geographical markets. Broadly speaking, 
formatting includes franchising, as in the localisation of a foreign product (McDonalds) or the 
licensed localisation of a TV show (Who Wants to be a Millionaire?). Sharing of resources and 
profits are negotiable, including the utilisation of local labour, a process that allows ostensibly 
foreign TV and cinema productions to be counted as local content.vii   
 
Dynamics of the regional market 
China’s lack of international and regional success in audio-visual media – apart from 
internationally financed film projects such as Zhang Yimou’s Hero (yingxiong) and House of 
Flying Daggers (shimian maifu) – can be contrasted with the fortunes of South Korea, which 
liberalised its censorship regimes in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, allowing filmmakers 
and television producers more creative latitude (Yoon, 2001). The results have been borne out in 
box office successes – risk-taking films like My Wife is a Gangster, Shiri and Ardour and the TV 
drama Winter Sonata (Lee, 2004).   
 Indeed, the aptly named Korean Wave has alerted many in China to the value of regional 
production. Not only are Korean TV series and movies popular in China, but they have managed 
to penetrate the hardest of all Asian markets – Japan. The lessons for China are obvious. Success 
lies in learning from its fast-flying neighbours. Taiwan’s GAMANIA, for instance, has developed 
popular games such as Lineage and Warring States, which tap into common reservoirs of 
Chinese history.  
A better understanding of the ‘new East Asian cultural co-prosperity zone’ allows China to 
move away from ideological opposition to US and European media (Keane, 2007). A recent 
surge in inter-Asian trade in TV romance drama, teen idol drama, anime and manga creates 
conditions of possibility for China’s dynamism as it draws creative skill resources from its own 
region. However, the key point is that rather than just imitating and adapting, China becomes a 
content originator, drawing upon its own vast cultural resources. In targeting the East Asian 
region and the international mandarin speaking community, Chinese creative content can reach 
an audience comparable to that of Hollywood.     
 
 Clusters and media capitals 
As we have seen, the structure of much Chinese media is illustrative of non-competitive 
fragmentation within a large market. Provinces and cities look to duplicate each other’s practices 
and each other’s output. The formation during the past several years of conglomerates such as 
China Radio Film and Television Group (CRFTG) and the Shanghai Media Group (SMG) are 
initiatives intended to consolidate the production of high-quality export content. This is not, 
however, the solution, merely one of the pieces of the jigsaw. I have written about this in depth 
elsewhere (Keane, 2006, 2007). New industries – video games, Internet-based content, and 
mobile services – present China with key development opportunities. While digital content 
provides greater efficiencies due to minimal reproduction costs (for example, digital cinema), 
actual content creation costs remain high. Producing a ‘hit’ video game is an expensive exercise. 
Provincial governments in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Zhejiang have allocated funds and 
tax relief policies to construct centres in order to incubate Chinese success.  
  
Conclusion 
Can China compete directly with Hollywood? The answer is almost certainly, no. Can China be a 
major provider of creative content for international markets? The answer is an unequivocal yes. 
Taking into account the size of the potential mandarin speaking market, as well as culturally 
proximate East and South-East Asia, one wonders why China’s media and digital content 
industry planners have not yet seized the opportunity. Of course, a preoccupation with national 
propaganda has meant that internationalising opportunities have been neglected.    
In this brief paper, I have outlined some residual impediments to the development of 
creative content industries in China. I have suggested that structure impacts upon dynamics, in 
turn reducing the innovative capacity within the system. It remains to be seen how resistant these 
forces are to change. However, starting from a low base, China is rapidly moving to develop its 
creative industries and to implement policies to generate value and investment. There is no 
certainty that the ‘created in China’ movement will solve some of the more deep-seated problems 
confronting media and cultural industries – namely political control and IP violation. There is 
also a need to draw upon the emerging talent base (see Qiongli Wu, this issue). Creative 
processes need to be deeply embedded in the education system, and the idea that quantity of 
production equates with economic value, a legacy of the socialist era, must be put to the sword. 
However, with the concept of creative industries now dispersed, primary actors do acknowledge 
that confronting such impediments are a solution to ameliorating China’s cultural trade deficit.    
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i In Europe the proportion of sunk cost in television production comprises on average 70 percent. The corresponding 
figure for publishing is 30 percent (Annis and Bughin, 2005). 
ii The field of media studies in English language is dominated by a tendency to calculate the impact of transnational 
media corporations in China. For a detailed critique of this see Keane et al., 2006.  
iii This approach derives in part from the work of Bain (1951) who investigated the relationships between market 
structure and performance in a range of industries, arguing that greater concentration results in greater profits.  
iv China is administratively divided into 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 centrally administrative 
municipalities and 2 special administrative regions (SAR). 
v Conversation with spokesperson from Real Networks China. SAPP is State Administration of Press and 
Publications;  SAIC is State Administration of Industry and Commerce.   
vi These issues cannot be dealt with in a limited space; I am referring to embedded practices including the use of 
guanxi (networks) and many flexible forms of finance and political patronage (see Kraus 2004 for a discussion of the 
arts sector)   
vii For an extensive discussion of this see Keane et al. (2006). 
